The Dartmouth College Case and the Founding of Historically Black Colleges by Stith, Kate & Blumenthal, Claire
The University of New Hampshire Law Review 
Volume 18 Number 1 Article 36 
11-20-2019 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kate Stith & Claire Blumenthal, The Dartmouth College Case and the Founding of Historically Black 
Colleges, 18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 27 (2019). 
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – 
Franklin Pierce School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in The University of New Hampshire Law Review by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire 
Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu. 
27 
 
Kate Stith & Claire Blumenthal 
The Dartmouth College Case and the Founding of 
Historically Black Colleges 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 27 (2019) 
A U T H O R .   Kate Stith is the Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law at Yale Law School.  She is an 
alumna of Dartmouth College, class of 1973.  Claire Blumenthal is a current candidate for J.D. at 




I. FORGING THE CONCEPT OF A PRIVATE CHARITABLE 
CORPORATION ......................................................................................... 28 
II. JUSTICE STORY’S EXPANSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ........................................................................................... 31 
III. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS AFTER THE 
CIVIL WAR ................................................................................................ 35 
IV. THE FOUNDING OF BLACK COLLEGES .................................................. 37 
  
®
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
28 
At the heart of the Dartmouth College campus, sheltered by Webster Hall’s 
portico, a bronze plaque reads: “Founded by Eleazer Wheelock; Refounded by 
Daniel Webster.”1  A reference to the Dartmouth College case, the inscription 
commemorates the decision’s pivotal role in the school’s survival.  The Supreme 
Court decision’s transformational impact, however, extends far beyond Hanover. 
I .  F OR GI NG T HE  C ONC E P T  OF  A P R I V AT E  C HAR I T AB L E  C OR P OR AT I ON  
Before the Supreme Court decided the Dartmouth College case in 1819, American 
common law jurisprudence did not clearly distinguish between public and private 
institutions of higher learning.2  Neither state legislatures nor courts addressed 
whether state-chartered charitable institutions remained “public”—and subject to 
plenary legislative oversight—if their funding sources were private.3  Moreover, 
even if privately funded eleemosynary corporations could be called “private,” it was 
unclear what protections, if any, that designation conferred against state 
interference.4   
 
1  Maurice G. Baxter, Daniel Webster & the Supreme Court 109 (1966).  
2  See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111 (1817).  The opinion of New 
Hampshire’s highest court, the Superior Court of Judicature, declined to address the broader legal 
question concerning the difference, if any, between public and private colleges.  Focusing on the 
facts of the case before it, the court noted that “whether an incorporated college . . . must be 
viewed as a public or as a private corporation” in all cases “it is not necessary now to decide, 
because it does not appear that Dartmouth College was subject to any private visitation whatever.”   
See also George Thomas, Rethinking the Dartmouth College Case in American Political Development: 
Constituting Public and Private Education Institutions, in 29 Studies in American Political 
Development 23, 24 (2015) (noting “the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ educational 
institutions does not accurately capture American colleges in existence in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries”); John S. Whitehead & Jurgen Herbst, How to Think About the Dartmouth 
College Case, in 26 Hist. of Educ. Quart. 333, 333–34, 343 (1986) (Whitehead asserting that, far from 
existing prior to the 1819, the distinction between private and public institutions did not develop 
until after the Civil War; both authors acknowledge, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Dartmouth College is a major obstacle to overcome in this argument). 
3  See generally John S. Whitehead, The Separation of College and State: Columbia, 
Dartmouth, Harvard and Yale, 1776-1876, 9–52 (1973) (recounting history of “alliances between 
college and states, 1775-1820,” and noting uncertainty regarding state authority in the absence of 
acquiescence by the college). 
4  Id.  See also Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won 
Their Civil Rights 78 (2018) (discussing how, before the Dartmouth College case, “[t]he contract 
clause only protected private parties, like individuals, from having their existing contracts 
interfered with by the government.”); id. at 80 (noting that the idea “that corporations were private 
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A 1790 decision by Virginia’s highest court crystallized the legal issue and 
presaged (not coincidentally) the Dartmouth College case.5  In Bracken v. Visitors of 
William and Mary College, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that state 
courts could not interfere with the governance of the College of William and Mary 
because it was a “private Eleemosynary institution” founded with “mere charitable 
donations.”6  The Court agreed with the attorney for William and Mary, future Chief 
Justice John Marshall,7 that the “bounty” the Virginia legislature subsequently 
contributed was just one more “donation to an old foundation” that, “though made 
by the public,” did not change the College’s fundamental identity.8  Nor did it matter 
that William and Mary’s purpose of higher education “concern[ed] the public.”9  The 
1790 decision noted in passing that often “[c]olleges and hospitals are classed 
together as private . . . [and are] subject to the will of the founder.”10  
But the Virginia Court’s understanding was far from universally accepted.  In 
1804, the United States Supreme Court held that “the act of incorporation which 
gives it existence,” not its founding funding source, determined a state-chartered 
insurance company’s public or private status.11  This was the view adopted by New 
Hampshire’s highest court, the Superior Court of Judicature, in the first stage of the 
Dartmouth College case.12   
The New Hampshire Court noted that Dartmouth College’s purpose was plainly 
public;13 the College was founded, in the words of its Charter, “for the education 
 
entities immunized by the Constitution’s contract clause from state takeover” was “a principle the 
law had never previously recognized explicitly” prior to the case). 
5  Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary Coll., 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790). 
6  Id. at 591–93. 
7  The 35-year-old Marshall had studied law and been elected to the Phil Beta Kappa Society at 
William and Mary, see https://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/John%20Marshall,%20the%20Great
%20Chief%20Justice.php [https://perma.cc/U6MF-H47L] (last visited Sept. 14, 2019).  The future 
Chief Justice’s arguments to Virginia’s highest court “foreshadowed his reasoning in the 
Dartmouth case,” Edwin D. Duryea and Donald T. Williams, The Academic Corporation: A 
History of College and University Governing Boards 111 (2013).  See also Florian Bartosic, 
With John Marshall from William and Mary to Dartmouth College, 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 259, 266 (1966) 
(noting that John Marshall faced the same issue both as attorney and as Chief Justice). 
8  Bracken, 7 Va. at 591–93. 
9  Id. at 593. 
10  Id. at 591.  
11  Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, 128 (1804).  
12  Trustees, 1 N.H. at 120 (stating “if such a corporation [as Dartmouth] is not to be considered 
as a public corporation, it would be difficult to find one that could be so considered.”). 
13  Id. at 117–20. 
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[and] instruction of [y]outh of the [I]ndian tribes . . . and also of English youth and 
any others.”14  Though the Court speculated that “whether a corporation is to be 
considered as public or private, depends on the objects for which its franchises are 
to be exercised,”15 it found that Dartmouth’s public purpose alone was not 
dispositive.16  Instead, the terms of a corporation’s charter determined its public or 
private identity.17  If the charter conferred property rights and beneficial interests 
to the chartering state, the corporation was public.18  If these rights belonged to the 
incorporators, the corporation was private. 19  The unanimous opinion, written by 
the well-respected Chief Justice William Richardson, concluded that Dartmouth 
could not be classified as a private institution because its trustees had no “private 
beneficial interest, either in their franchises or [the] property [of the College].”20  
Indeed, the New Hampshire Court held that the Dartmouth trustees, as fiduciaries 
of a public corporation, were ipso facto public officers of the state.21 
When the Dartmouth College case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices 
rejected the New Hampshire Court’s conclusion that Dartmouth was a public 
institution.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion was narrow.  It was limited to this 
publicly chartered “eleemosynary” institution and stated that “it can require no 
argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a 
contract . . . . Dartmouth College is really endowed to private individuals . . . it is 
then an eleemosynary . . . and so far as respects its funds, a private corporation.”22  
 
14  Charter of Dartmouth College (1769), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~trustees/docs/
charter-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS5S-VK66], cited in Trustees, 1 N.H. at 118. 
15  Trustees, 1 N.H. at 117–18. 
16  Id. at 118–20. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 119–20. 
19  Id. at 116–17, 120 (“Public corporations are those which are created for public purposes, and 
whose . . . corporators have no private beneficial interest, either in their franchises of their 
property . . . A gift to a corporation created for public purposes is in reality a gift to the 
public . . . [If] such a corporation [as Dartmouth were] not to be considered as a public 
corporation, it would be difficult to find one that could be so considered.”). 
20  Id. at 117. 
21  Id. at 119 (“The office of trustee of Dartmouth College is, in fact, a public trust, as much so as 
the office of governor, or of judge of this court”).  
22  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 627, 633–34 (1819).  See also Christopher 
M. Joseph, Joseph Story and the Dartmouth College Case: Expansion of the Contract Clause, 1 Fairmount 
Folio: J. History 17, 21 (1996) (noting that Marshall, instead of making a broad vested rights 
argument, “focused on the contract clause’s application to Dartmouth College as a private 
eleemosynary institution.”). 
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Justice Marshall echoed the decision of Virginia’s highest court in 1790: because of 
its private founding and funding, the institution was private, 23 despite its public 
charter and purpose.24  Accordingly, the Constitution's Contracts Clause protected 
Dartmouth’s contracts—including, according to the Court, the Charter the British 
Crown granted it in 1769—from unilateral modification by the State of New 
Hampshire.25 
I I .  J US T I C E  S T OR Y ’ S  E X P A NS I V E  UNDE R S T A NDI NG OF  C OR P OR A T E  C I V I L  
R I GH T S  
By its terms, Justice Marshall’s opinion applied only to private, eleemosynary 
institutions.  But Justice Joseph Story’s concurring opinion pronounced that the 
Court’s Dartmouth College decision liberated all private corporations, whether 
commercial or charitable.26  In Story’s view, only where a corporation’s “whole 
interests and franchises [were] the exclusive property and domain of the 
government itself” could the government “regulate, control and direct the 
corporation.”27  Both Justices embraced Daniel Webster’s argument that, just as 
states could not revoke a land grant recipient’s property rights, they could not 
infringe on a private corporation’s privileges once conferred by contract, without 
having reserved that power explicitly.28  As historians Oscar Handlin and Mary F. 
 
23  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 632–35. 
24  See R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of Public and Private Corporations and the Rise 
of the American Business Corporation, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 825, 831 (1976) [hereinafter, Newmyer, Justice 
Joseph Story’s Doctrine] (noting that Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College “ignor[ed] his own 
statement in Providence Insurance Co.” by maintaining that funding source determines 
corporate status).  See also id. at 826–28 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s conception of 
corporate status leading up to the Dartmouth College case). 
25  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 645, 652, 654 (finding a violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States 
Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any “Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts”). 
26  Id. at 666, 668–69 (Story, J., concurring) (“[S]trictly speaking, public corporations are such 
only as are founded by the government, for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also 
the government.  If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the 
government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, 
either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institution.”).  
27  Id. at 671–72; see also Francis N. Stites, Private Interest & Public Gain: the Dartmouth 
College Case, 1819 at 84–85 (1972) (discussing Justice Story’s view of private property and 
corporations, as well as his expansion of the case’s holding to encompass all corporations).  
28  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 567–68 (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 682 (Story, J., concurring).  See also Winkler, 
supra note 4, at 82 (discussing Webster’s argument that, as with private property, lawmakers could 
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Handlin explained in 1953, “[When] Marshall and Story held in 1819 that the charter 
was a contract protected by the Federal Constitution . . . a sturdy bulwark against 
legislative interference [was] erected around the corporation.”29  The Handlins’ 
interpretation endures; published last year, economic historian Adam Winkler’s 
history of U.S. corporate law concludes that Dartmouth College “fundamentally 
reconceived the nature of the American corporation.”30 
This canonical interpretation of the case’s significance tends to emphasize how 
its protections against government interference transformed American corporate 
law and the national economy.  Private corporations grew in number, size, and 
power after the Dartmouth College decision, buttressed by its new property 
protections.31   
But exclusive focus on the case’s implications for private corporations serving 
private purposes misses its import for other types of private institutions: those, like 
Dartmouth, engaged in higher education.  In the Dartmouth College decision, the 
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged a category of corporation for the first 
time—what Marshall called “private eleemosynary institutions,” and what we now 
call private charitable corporations or private nonprofits.  Despite serving public 
purposes, these private institutions were still, in Marshall’s words, “artificial 
being[s];”32 they were “no more a state instrument, than a natural person [pursuing 
public goals like education] would be.”33  
The idea of an “artificial” person was not new.34  In constitutionalizing the 
concept, however, the Supreme Court insulated private educational entities from 
 
not “lawfully snatch away” the rights conferred by a corporation’s charter); id. at 87 (discussing 
Justice Story’s “reservation clause”); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist: 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1665, 1673 
(2000) (discussing Justice Story’s focus on a corporation’s character being determined by its 
founding financial sources); Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 832–36 (1976) 
(discussing Justice Story’s strategic vision for how the Dartmouth College case would transform 
corporate law and lead to growth in use of the corporate form in the United States). 
29  Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, in 
Enterprise and Secular Change 119 (Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma, eds., 1953). 
30  Winkler, supra note 4, at 85–86.  
31  Id. at 87.  See also Art. IV: Manufacturing Corporations, 2 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 92, 94 (Jul. 1829) 
(providing a contemporaneous account of the growth in private corporations in America, 
especially compared to other countries like England, in the decade following the Dartmouth College 
decision).  
32  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 636, 638 (Marshall, C.J.). 
33  Id. at 636.  See also id. at 645 (declaring that “the law of this case is the law of all.”). 
34  Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 837. 
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government interference and provided a legal pathway for them to claim many of 
the same civil rights the Constitution bestowed on natural persons.35  
Justice Story himself recognized the potential civil rights significance of the 
Dartmouth College decision.  In a private letter to legal scholar and jurist, Chancellor 
James Kent of New York, Story expressed his hope that the Dartmouth College 
decision would shield all non-state institutions from “any undue encroachments 
upon [their] civil rights, which the passions or the popular doctrines of the day may 
stimulate our State Legislatures to adopt.”36  
As Justice Story described, the Dartmouth College case involved a state 
government seeking to secularize and broaden an institution’s curriculum and 
public role.  The Jeffersonian Republicans had ousted the Federalists in the 1816 
 
35  Winkler ultimately asserts that in Dartmouth College and later cases, the Supreme Court 
recognized corporations’ civil rights by a transitive property.  He argues that, rather than existing 
as legal persons independently, corporations merely assert their members’ individual rights.  See 
Winkler, supra note 4, at 66–68, 86–87.  The Court’s language in the Dartmouth decision, however, 
tracks the traditional interpretation more closely.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion states that the 
“properties” of this “artificial being . . . are considered as the same, and may act as a single 
individual.”  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 636.  Story’s opinion does note that as “an artificial person . . . [a 
corporation’s rights] must be exercised through the medium of its natural members,” but this 
qualification appears more logistical than substantive—that as practical matter, corporations rely 
on their members to pursue their purposes and civil rights.  Trustees, 17 U.S. at 667 (Story, J., 
concurring).  Justice Story goes on to emphasize that because of their “collective 
character . . . [corporations] posses[s] certain immunities, privileges and capacities . . . which do 
not belong to the natural persons composing it,” that their artificial personhood is “considered as 
subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage,” and that “a 
corporation may sue and be sued by its own members . . . as with any strangers.”  Id. at 667–668.  
Each of these clauses strongly suggests a legal entity endowed with independent, recognizable 
rights and status, rather than one reliant on its members’ rights.  See also Newmyer, Justice Joseph 
Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 827–28 (discussing how the Dartmouth College Case impacted the 
understanding of corporation’s rights and their legal source).   
36  Joseph Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story 331 (William W. Story ed., 1851).  Story’s 
exchange with Chancellor Kent, facilitated by Daniel Webster himself, reveals how Webster and 
Story coordinated their legal efforts in the Dartmouth College case.  Story wanted the Court to rule 
on private corporations’ rights, and Webster wanted Dartmouth’s victory.  Story advised Webster 
to bring three suits separate from the Dartmouth College case, all involving state authority over 
non-charitable corporations, and then coordinated with the circuit court judge so that they could 
be accelerated to the Supreme Court.  The Court never heard these other three cases; there was no 
need, inasmuch as Story incorporated his views on private corporations’ rights into his Dartmouth 
College case concurrence.  While Story was writing his concurrence, Webster sent sources and 
citations to the Justice to incorporate into his opinion.  For more discussion of Justice Story’s 
coordination with Daniel Webster, see Christopher M. Joseph, Joseph Story and the Darthmouth 
College Case, supra note 22, at 24–25.   
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election, and the newly elected Governor, William Plumer, advocated Thomas 
Jefferson’s vision of a non-sectarian university that prepared young men for 
vocations beyond the ministry.37  In its Dartmouth College decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down the recent state laws that would have transformed Dartmouth 
College into Dartmouth University and given the Governor extensive authority in 
selecting the institution’s trustees and overseers.  The Court’s decision halted the 
legislative transformation, thereby preserving a small, Calvinist, religious 
institution that was far less ideologically open and academically ambitious than the 
“University” Governor Plumer and the Republicans sought.38  Arguably, the case’s 
winners were conventional and narrow-minded, and its losers, broad-minded 
reformers. 
Still, independent of its impact in Hanover, the Dartmouth College decision 
protected all private colleges and universities—including those that served or would 
serve marginalized groups otherwise excluded from higher education in the 
nineteenth century.  It is no coincidence that America’s first women’s colleges were 
founded in the decision’s wake, beginning with Ipswich and Mount Holyoke in 1828 
and 1837, respectively.39  Similarly, though only six Roman Catholic colleges existed 
before the Dartmouth College case, an additional thirty-four were founded in the 
subsequent three decades.40  And, apparently encouraged by the Dartmouth College 
decision, “dozens more religiously affiliated private colleges sprung up throughout 
New England.”41 
The Dartmouth College decision’s corporate protections deserve renewed 
historical attention for their role in empowering discrete, insular groups against 
public aggression or antagonism.  In the remainder of this essay, we focus on the 
history of private colleges established in the nineteenth century for the education of 
African-Americans.  We propose that the Dartmouth College case planted a legal seed 
that, decades later, contributed to the forming and flourishing of institutions 
 
37  Stites, supra note 27, at 13 (describing Governor Plumer’s belief that it was “mistaken that 
the great object of colleges was to educate young men for priesthood, rather than to qualify them 
for the duties of civil life”).  See also id. at 126, n. 33 (noting that Governor Plumer’s admiration for 
Thomas Jefferson was so profound that he sent Mr. Jefferson a copy of remarks he had written). 
38  Lynn W. Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire 1759-1850 247–49 (1962). 
39  Helen Lefkwoitz Horowitz, Alma Mater: Design and Experience in Women’s 
Colleges from Their Nineteenth Century Beginnings to the 1930s 9, 11 (2nd ed. 1984). 
40  Matthew Garrett, The Identity of American Catholic Higher Education: A Historical Overview, 10 J. 
Cath. Educ. 229, 230–31 (2006). 
41  Joel Richard Paul, Without Precedent: John Marshall and His Times 380 (2018). 
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devoted to the education of newly-freed men—and, often, women42—in former 
slave states, despite unparalleled public hostility. 
I I I .  P UB L I C  E DUC AT I ON AND AF R I C AN- AME R I C AN S  AF T E R  T HE  C I VI L  
WAR  
Before the Civil War, slavery and segregation categorically foreclosed 
educational opportunities for nearly all black Americans, though a few institutions 
of higher learning for black students had been founded in areas of Pennsylvania and 
Ohio harboring strong abolitionist sentiment.43  At War’s end, ninety-four percent 
of America’s black population lived in the former Confederacy and, due to 
prohibitions against educating slaves, ninety percent of them were illiterate.44  
Emancipation alone could not materially improve their educational opportunities.45 
To be sure, public education in the former Confederacy grew significantly after 
the War.  While the North had developed public elementary and secondary schools 
beginning in the seventeenth century, the South had never systematically 
established public schools.46  White businessmen and small farmers clamored for 
free public schools for their children but faced class-based resistance from wealthy 
landowners fearing socioeconomic disruption.47 
Divided as white Southerners might have been over public education for whites, 
they were united in opposing educational opportunities for their black neighbors.  
Historians Henry Drewry and Humphrey Doermann detail how “[b]lack schools 
were burned; teachers and students harassed or attacked; and black parents fired 
from jobs if their children were known to be attending school.” 48  Such entrenched 
and uniform racist hostility blocked nearly all possibility of state-supported 
education for African-Americans—including elementary and secondary schools—
during and, except for the brief period of Reconstruction, after the Civil War.49  
 
42  Henry N. Drewry & Humphrey Doermann, Stand and Prosper: Private Black 
Colleges and Their Students 44 (2012) (“Colonial colleges [almost all in the North] enrolled 
only males, whereas in early black colleges, coeducation was common.”). 
43  Ronyelle Bertrand Ricard & M. Christopher Brown II, Ebony Towers in Higher 
Education: The Evolution, Mission, and Presidency of Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities 8 (2008). 
44  Drewry, supra note 42, at 34 (2012).    
45  Id. at 34.  
46  Id. at 42.  
47  Id. at 34, 41-43.  
48  Id. at 43. 
49  Id. at 34–36, 43. 
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In 1862, Congress had passed the Morrill Land Grant Act, which provided 
federal land for states to create liberal and practical educational institutions.50  
Sixty-nine land grant schools were quickly founded throughout the United States, 
creating a national, public higher education network.51  The Morrill Act was a boon 
for white Americans in the South.  For most black Americans, however, the first 
Morrill Act never existed in any practical sense.  The white Southerners who 
controlled their states’ legislatures and distributed the Morrill Act’s resources 
refused to spend them on black higher education,52 just as after Reconstruction they 
refused to appropriate state tax revenues to support primary and secondary 
education for black citizens.53  
Eventually, Congress responded to Southern legislatures’ discriminatory use of 
federal funds.  In 1890, it passed the Second Morrill Act, which required as a 
condition of federal support that states admit black students to existing white land-
grant colleges or create “colleges separately for white and colored students . . . [with 
an] equitable division” of its funds.54  The Second Morrill Act’s benefits were limited 
in the South; there was insufficient federal oversight and enforcement, and the Act 
 
50  7 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.  See John A. Moore, Are State-Supported Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities Justifiable after Fordice – A Higher Education Dilemma, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 547, 550 
(2000).  For more, see Kristen Broady’s discussion, of how although a provision of the Morrill Act 
withheld benefits from any states currently in rebellion or insurrection against the United 
States—which included, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Texas, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—its relevance was short-lived with the 
War’s 1865 conclusion.  After the Civil War, these states could and did receive federal land grants, 
but they continued to forbid black Americans from attending the universities those grants helped 
create.  Kristen E. Broady et al., Dreaming and Doing at Georgia HBCUs: Continued Relevancy in ‘Post-
Racial’ America, 44 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 37, 39 (2017).  
51  Id. at 39.   
52  The Unique Role and Mission of Historically Black Colleges and Universities: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor H. R., 100th Cong. 12 (1988) 
(statement of Dr. Robert L. Albright, President, Johnson C. Smith University).  
53  See also Drewry, supra note 42, at 41–42 (discussing how, using perverted logic, state 
legislatures rationalized their discriminatory refusal to provide public funds for black education 
by arguing that, since public-school funds came from property taxes and black Americans owned 
little-to-no property, any black schools should not be allowed access to public revenue; yet whites 
without property could still send their children to the new public schools, which children of tax-
paying black citizens were barred from attending).  
54  Racial Discrimination by Colleges Restricted, 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1890). 
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essentially codified the illusory and denigrating concept of “separate but equal.”55  
Although sixteen Southern and Border states created public colleges for the 
education of black students, these were grossly underfunded.56  
Even after the Second Morrill Act, then, Southern state legislatures’ racism 
foreclosed public higher education.  Private higher education remained the only 
option available to most black Americans, the majority of whom remained in the 
South. 
I V.  T HE  F OUNDI NG OF  B L A C K  C OL L E GE S  
No historian seems to have connected the Dartmouth College decision—and its 
recognition of private educational institutions’ rights—to the rise of black colleges 
in former Confederacy and Border states immediately after the Civil War.  That 
said, several scholars have recognized that these colleges existed precisely because 
they were private institutions.  Historians Drewry and Doermann hypothesize that 
“[t]he widespread opposition [to higher education for black citizens during this 
period] suggests why the private and not the public sector took the lead in providing 
black education.”57  Another scholar, Kristen Broady, agrees that “African Americans 
in [Southern] states . . . relied on private [historically black colleges and universities] 
as they were prohibited from attending white institutions,” private or public.58  
The Dartmouth College decision had quickly enshrined the proposition that 
private corporations—and specifically “private eleemosynary” institutions—were 
significantly shielded from state government interference.59  In this way, decades 
 
55  It is notable that Congress, not the Supreme Court, seems to have been the first federal 
department to approve the concept of “separate but equal” as compatible with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896).   
56  Reginald Wilson, Can Black Colleges Solve the Problem of Access for Black Students, 98 Am. J. Educ. 
443, 446 (1990) (reporting that the Second Morrill Act resulted in the establishment of sixteen black 
colleges, which remained “systematically underfunded by both federal and state sources”).  See also 
Travis J. Albritton, Educating Our Own: The Historical Legacy of HBCUs and Their Relevance for 
Educating a New Generation of Leaders,” 44 Urb. Rev. 311, 316 (2012) (“‘State funding for Alabama’s 
black land-grant institution remained constant at $4,000 annually.  Unlike its white counterpart, 
whose state funding averaged $65,000 yearly between 1900 and 1916, at no time during the period 
did the black college benefit from special appropriations ‘to meet the growth in enrollment and 
the advancing cost of maintenance.’”). 
57  Drewry, supra note 42, at 34.  
58  Broady, supra note 50, at 39. 
59  See, e.g., Visitors of St. John’s Coll. v. State, 15 Md. 330, 374 (1860) (“The leading and controlling 
case on this subject is that of Dartmouth College v[]. Woodward, . . . argued at great length and with 
rare ability.  The judgment pronounced in it, has been the settled law of the land ever since.”); see 
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later, the case provided a legal route for black Americans to pursue higher education 
in a virulently hostile South.  Especially between 1862 and 1890, Southern blacks and 
their supporters embraced the private corporate form the Dartmouth College case 
protected as a tool to defend and advance human dignity.60 
Despite the enormous challenge of simultaneously establishing primary and 
advanced educational opportunities, Northern freedmen’s societies, religious 
missionary groups, and black Southern communities, assisted by the Freedmen’s 
Bureau that Congress established in 1865,61 partnered to charter private schools for 
newly freed slaves.  Many of these started as primary or secondary schools and later 
evolved into private, higher education institutions.62 
Only a few years after Appomattox, the Dartmouth College decision’s protection 
of private charitable corporations had transformed the educational horizon of black 
Americans.  Between 1866 and 1870, the number of private black educational 
institutions, including grade schools and high schools, in the United States 
increased from 740 to 2,677.63  An 1870 report by the Freedmen’s Bureau listed 
ninety-five “Advanced Schools and Colleges for black Students” (meaning high 
schools and colleges), almost all of them in former Confederate or Border states.64  
Some of the most famous and prestigious private black universities were 
established during this period, including Shaw University, in North Carolina, in 
 
also Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 492, 497 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (Story, Circuit Justice) (relying on the 
Dartmouth College case, abrogating Maine’s annulment of Bowdoin College’s charter, and holding 
that “no authority exists in the government to regulate, control, or direct a corporation, or its 
funds,” if it is an eleemosynary corporation, founded with private monies).  
60  Broady, supra note 50, at 39, 41. 
61  Drewry, supra note 42, at 35–40. 
62  Ricard, supra note 43, at 8.  In this way, their development paralleled Dartmouth’s.  
Dartmouth College grew out of Eleazer Wheelock’s unchartered “Moor’s Charity School,” a 
secondary school that continued to exist for some years even after Dartmouth College began 
admitting students.  Stites, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
63  Thomas Jesse Jones, Bureau of Edu. Dep’t of Interior, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Southern 
Schools, in Negro Education: A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for Colored 
People in the United States 38, at 289 (1917), reprinted in Drewry, supra note 42, at 40.  See also 
Wilson, supra note 56, at 443 (noting that, although the first college devoted to the education of 
African-Americans was founded before the Civil War in 1837—Cheyney University in 
Pennsylvania, “the overwhelming majority were begun after 1865 in response to two concerns: the 
need to quickly establish institutions to educate the newly freed slaves and the segregationist 
sentiments of southern educators who opposed integrating blacks into already-existing white 
schools and colleges.”). 
64  Drewry, supra note 42, at 48, commenting on John W. Alvord, Freedmen’s Schools, 52–54 
(1980). 
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1865; Fisk University, in Tennessee, in 1866; and Howard University, in the District 
of Columbia, in 1867.65  The historian Reginald Wilson underscores that private 
black colleges, beyond the reach of prejudiced state governments, continued to 
“carr[y] the substantial responsibility of educating blacks at the college level” until 
the late 1930s.66  
It is true that after the Dartmouth College case, state governments, picking up on 
Story’s caveat in his concurring opinion,67 generally adopted a “reserve” provision 
subjecting all state-issued charters to possible legislative modification.68  But we 
have found no record that legislatures exercised such reserved power upon the 
private black colleges and universities established in the Civil War’s wake.  Southern 
legislatures seem to have simply ignored these schools.  
America’s higher education institutions have evolved dramatically since the 
1930s, not to mention since the 1819 Dartmouth College decision.  The decision’s clear 
distinction between public and private colleges, whose full significance was 
probably uncertain in 1819,69 has blurred with time.70  Today, public and private 
funds support virtually all U.S. colleges and universities, and non-discrimination 
 
65  Moore, supra note 50, at 549–50. 
66  Wilson, supra note 56, at 444. 
67  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 712 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).  
68  See also In re Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U.S. 190, 213–14 (1871) (holding that the 
Pennsylvania legislature had not violated the Constitution’s Contracts Clause when it altered the 
location of a private college pursuant to a reserve clause in the charter itself).  
69  See Duryea, supra note 7, at 125–26 (“Until the Dartmouth case the distinction [between 
private and public colleges] rested on an uncertain foundation, and legislatures continued to 
approve financial support [to established colleges] and, in turn, when the occasion arose, to 
intrude into their affairs. . . . [T]he original Dartmouth trustees . . . forced a final determination 
of the distinction that we now know between private and public higher education.”).  But see 
Whitehead, supra note 2, at 337 (arguing that the growth in government funding for colleges after 
the Civil War perhaps contributed to the “emergence of the private/public distinction” in higher 
education, which Whitehead believes was a “post-[Civil] war phenomenon.”). 
70  See, e.g., Thomas A. Barnico, Dartmouth’s Link to Today’s College Oversight Bills: Supreme Court 
Held School was Private, not Public, CommonWealth (June 15, 2019), 
https://commonwealthmagazine.org/opinion/dartmouths-link-to-todays-college-oversight-
bills/ [https://perma.cc/AGF2-UFS6]; John P. Mackenzie, Yale Head Hits ‘Coercive Power’ of U.S. 
Funds, Wash. Post (Feb. 22, 1975) (quoting Yale President Kingman Brewster, Jr.’s Address to the 
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, that “the ‘coercive power of the federal purse’ is 
infringing on the right of private educational institutions to set their own policies”), reprinted in 
121 Con. Rec. S5869, at 5827–28 (daily ed. March 10, 1975).  
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and other state and federal laws apply equally to all such institutions.71  Judge Henry 
Friendly, in a 1968 address at Dartmouth commemorating the sesquicentennial of 
Daniel Webster’s argument, famously subtitled his lecture the “public-private 
penumbra.”72  
Still, it appears that in the Civil War’s aftermath, the Dartmouth College case’s 
recognition of private charitable corporations was pivotal.  The protections it 
guaranteed provided a legal alternative for newly emancipated black Americans 
who ardently sought education and were denied access to both private white 
institutions and public support. 
 
* * * 
 
The Dartmouth College case did “Refound” Dartmouth College, as the plaque at 
Webster Hall says, but our traditional appreciation of the decision has been too 
circumscribed.  Undoubtedly, it contributed to the American corporate economy’s 
transformation.  And, by creating and protecting the category of private 
eleemosynary institutions, the Dartmouth College decision also had important 
implications for black Americans’ struggle for education.  In ways that even Justice 
Story could not have fully comprehended, the decision would help preempt “undue 
encroachments upon civil rights.”73 
 
 
71  Because the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to “state action,” the 
distinction between “private” and “public” colleges was a double-edged sword for African 
Americans seeking to attend private institutions of higher learning, prior to the enactment of 
federal civil rights legislation in 1964.  For example, as late as 1962, a federal court in Louisiana 
held that Tulane University was “private” within the meaning of the Dartmouth decision because 
of the private sources of its funding; therefore, the court reasoned, Tulane’s overt racial 
discrimination was not “the action of the State of Louisiana” and not proscribed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Guillory v. Adm’s of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 679, 684 (E.D. La. 1962). 
72  Henry Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and The Public-Private Penumbra 
(1969) (published by the University of Texas). 
73  Story, supra note 36, at 331.  
